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Abstract
Blockchain, as the backbone technology of the current popular Bitcoin digital currency, has become
a promising decentralized data management framework. Although blockchain has been widely adopted
in many applications, e.g., finance, healthcare, and logistics, its application in mobile services is still
limited. This is due to the fact that blockchain users need to solve preset proof-of-work puzzles to add
new data, i.e., a block, to the blockchain. Solving the proof-of-work, however, consumes substantial
resources in terms of CPU time and energy, which is not suitable for resource-limited mobile devices. To
facilitate blockchain applications in future mobile Internet of Things systems, multiple access mobile
edge computing appears to be an auspicious solution to solve the proof-of-work puzzles for mobile
users. We first introduce a novel concept of edge computing for mobile blockchain. Then, we introduce
an economic approach for edge computing resource management. Moreover, a prototype of mobile edge
computing enabled blockchain systems is presented with experimental results to justify the proposed
concept.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchain works as a decentralized public ledger which can store data, i.e., records of trans-
actions. Blockchain outperforms centralized ledger approaches which suffer from low efficiency
due to a bottleneck, single point failure and security attack, and moral hazard. Alternatively, data
is recorded by blockchain as blocks, e.g., collections of transactions, which form a linked list
data structure to indicate logical relations among the data added to the blockchain. No centralized
entity or intermediary is required to maintain data blocks. Instead, the data blocks are copied
and shared over an entire blockchain network to prevent system failure, data manipulation, and
cyber attacks. Blockchain has been applied in several distributed system scenarios, e.g., content
delivery networks [1] and smart grid systems [2].
The key concept to guarantee data integrity and validity in blockchain is a computational
process defined as mining [3]. To append a new block of data to the current blockchain, a
blockchain user, i.e., miner, is required to solve a compute-intensive proof-of-work (PoW) to
obtain a hash value that links previous block to the current block. After solving the PoW, the
result is broadcast to other miners in the networks for validation. The new block is successfully
added if majority of miners agree or reach consensus. Many consensus protocol gives a reward
to the successful miner as an incentive to solve PoW. However, due to the required PoW
computation contribution, resource-limited nodes such as Internet of Things (IoT) and mobile
devices cannot directly participate in the mining and consensus process, introducing major
challenge in blockchain applications for IoT and other mobile services.
Mobile edge computing [4] (MEC) architecture has been introduced to leverage available
computing power in mobile environments. Local data centers and servers are deployed by a
service provider at the “edge” of mobile networks, e.g., base stations of radio access networks.
MEC is the key technology to meet stringent low-latency requirements of 5G networks [6].
Mobile devices can access the edge servers to enhance their computing capability, e.g., IoT
sensing data processing. With this feature, edge computing becomes a promising solution for
mobile blockchain applications, the benefits of which are as follows. Firstly, by incorporating
more miners, the robustness of the blockchain network is naturally improved. Secondly, the
mobile users have an incentive from the reward obtained in the consensus process. However, edge
computing services are deployed by the provider to maximize its benefit. As such, a pricing issue
of the edge services arises. Accordingly, given the pricing adopted by the edge computing service
3provider, miners also need to optimize their demand for edge computing service for solving PoW
to maximize their payoffs. Pricing is a commonly used incentive technique adopted in wireless
networks [9]. For example, in [10], the authors proposed a pricing mechanism to incentivize
cooperative communication between mobile terminals, which can significantly decrease both the
communication and battery outage.
In this article, we consider an edge computing enabled mobile blockchain network, where IoT
devices or mobile users can access and utilize resources or computing services from an edge com-
puting service provider [5] to support their blockchain applications. First, we present overviews
of blockchain and edge computing architecture in Section II and Section III, respectively. We
propose a prototype of an edge computing system for mobile blockchain in Section IV. Then,
in Sections V and VI, we propose pricing schemes for the edge computing services for mobile
blockchain. Some typical numerical results are presented to show important findings from the
proposed pricing scheme.
II. BLOCKCHAIN OVERVIEW
The basic idea of blockchain is a chain-shaped data structure, also called a chain of blocks or
a blockchain. Each data block contains historical verified data or transactions. The blockchain
can be replicated and spread to all participants, i.e., users, in a publicly accessible blockchain
network such that it is synchronized globally.
A. Blockchain Architecture
Data Organization in Blockchain: Figure 1 shows the diagram of a blockchain structure.
Each block in the blockchain typically contains two parts, i.e., transaction data and hash values.
Transaction data are recorded by the blockchain users or systems, e.g., mobile sensing devices.
Hash values are used to store coded or secured information. A hash value in a block is generated
based on the information of the previous block, which is similar to a link pointing from the current
block to the block prior to it. The first block in the blockchain is called genesis block. A newly
generated block is validated and sequentially appended to the genesis block or the block earlier
to form a chain of blocks.
Basic blockchain implementation: In general, blockchain operates in the following steps.
1) A blockchain user performs a transaction and creates a new transaction record. The new
transaction will be transferred to neighboring peer users in the blockchain network.
42) Each peer user collects the transferred transactions for a certain period of time. Invalid user
transactions, e.g., fake transactions, will be discarded. After the period, the user which has
collected a set of transactions packs the transactions into a block and performs mining by
solving PoW. The users are referred to as miners.
3) The mined block is then sent into the network to notify other users. Other users which
receive the mined block will examine the validity with security mechanisms. If the block is
proved valid by majority of users, it will be appended to the end of the current blockchain.
This is the consensus process.
B. Consensus and Mining: A Trust Overlay on a Trustless Network
Distributed consensus: Blockchain can offer more than cryptography for transactions and data
in trustless distributed networks. While cryptographic techniques are adopted in mining to prevent
the blockchain from being changed, falsified, or deleted by malicious middleman users, the
blockchain is guaranteed to be acknowledged by many users. Consensus is a mechanism to ensure
trust in the network, which means that users in the network commonly reach an agreement of a
block added to the existing blockchain. The users can discover the false transaction injected by
an attacker by obtaining and checking the acknowledged blockchain from the network. As such,
the majority of users can “veto” to discard the false transaction. The deployment of consensus
is useful for distributed computing systems with independent users, e.g., mobile networks [7].
Proof-of-work based mining: However, consensus may still be vulnerable to attacks, e.g.,
Sybil attack, where an attacker creates fake blockchain information and many pseudonymous
users in the network. The fake blockchain information and pseudonymous users can lead to the
consensus of false transactions generated by the attacker. The solution to such attacks is to raise
the complexity of mining so that attackers cannot have enough computing power to support
fake users in the network. Proof-of-work (PoW) is used to increase the mining complexity.
It is a process of work which is difficult to produce but easy for verification. Solving PoW
has to calculate a value that makes the header hash value lower than a given “difficulty target”.
Confirming and securing the integrity and validity of transactions are executed by a set of miners.
In many blockchain systems, e.g., Bitcoin, a miner which successfully mines a block receives
the mining reward when the mined block is successfully added to the blockchain. The consensus
guarantees the security and dependability of blockchain systems [3]. In the blockchain network
where mining is costly, attackers need to control over 51% of all the computing power in the
5network to manipulate the blockchain. This is an enormous cost for the attackers which can
rarely be feasible in practice.
III. EDGE COMPUTING SERVICES FOR MOBILE BLOCKCHAIN
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Figure 1: Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) Enabled Blockchain.
A. Beyond Bitcoin: Edge Computing Services for Mobile Blockchain
Recently, blockchain has found many applications in various networks and distributed systems
today, one of them is IoT [8]. IoT systems connect a variety of physical objects such as mobile
devices, sensors and actuators to the Internet. The IoT devices can sense, communicate, and
exchange information with each other to achieve a certain goal of the systems, e.g., smart
transportation, logistics, healthcare, and manufacturing. However, IoT devices are usually low-
powered, geographically distributed, and possibly mobile. Limited computing resource and en-
ergy supply of IoT devices become major barriers when blockchain is applied to IoT systems
specifically because of the mining process. Instead, mobile edge computing can supply computing
and communication resources for mobile blockchain. Mobile edge computing [4] allows service
providers to deploy cloud computing services at the “edge” of the mobile Internet as shown in
Fig. 1. For example, base stations equipped with a small data center or a set of servers in radio
6access networks can accept offloaded jobs from adjacent mobile and IoT devices [11]. By pro-
viding local computing power, edge computing enables blockchain deployment in IoT networks
to support solving PoW puzzles, hashing, encryption algorithms, and possibly consensus.
Interactions among edge computing service providers and IoT devices or users can be modeled
as market activities, where the providers sell resources such as data and computing power,
generating a revenue from IoT users. In practice, the similar concept that integrates cloud and
blockchain has been realized. For example, Microsoft provides Blockchain as a Service (BaaS)
on the Azure cloud platform. A UK company CloudHashing offers Bitcoin Mining as a Service
(MaaS) where the users only buy software services online to mine Bitcoins, without installing
and deploying hardware equipment. IBM provides Watson IoT platform to manage IoT data in
a private blockchain ledger, which is integrated in IBM’s business-level cloud services. Despite
all the cloud-based blockchain services, economic models for blockchain transactions in edge
computing systems are not well studied. Furthermore, the edge computing service is able to
provide the near-to-end computing units such as fog nodes or edge devices which are closer to
the miners, where the latency is much smaller than that of the cloud computing. Therefore, it is
suitable for delay-sensitive IoT applications.
B. Application Scenarios
Edge computing services for mobile blockchain can be applied to various application scenarios.
1) Secured Smart Home: Home appliances that upload a large quantity of home and personal
data to centralized databases controlled by smart device manufacturers or retailers may be
exposed to serious privacy problems [8]. Therefore, edge computing for IoT with blockchain can
provide a transparent and secured alternative framework for private data management in smart
home.
2) Smart Grid: Smart grid systems [12] contain heterogeneous sensors, e.g., smart meters.
For smart meters, energy consumption data and energy transactions are recorded. The edge
computing can be integrated alongside with smart meters to process complex jobs automatically,
e.g., preparing transactions, executing smart electricity contracts and balancing the grid load [13].
The similar concept can be applied for plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) [2] to support
energy storage sharing.
7C. Open Issues
Although blockchain has been applied to many applications, some open issues exist.
1) Security: Although blockchain offers attractive security features for distributed data pro-
cessing and storage, some security issues emerge when blockchain is used with edge computing,
especially private blockchains. One possible implementation can be the small-scaled “whitelisted”
IoT networks [8] where all network nodes trust each other, and PoW is not required. In this
case, attacks can happen when transaction data is transferred from mobile or IoT devices to edge
computing servers. A secure and trusted network between the devices and servers is required.
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks can be easily launched to disrupt the connection and
operation of mobile blockchain. Likewise, since the mobile and IoT devices rely on wireless
transmission, jamming attacks can disrupt the blockchain data exchange. Finally, with PoW,
mobile blockchain is subject to typical 51% attacks that attackers control majority of computing
power. This attack becomes likely as the mobile and IoT devices have limited computing power
and/or may not rely on external costly computing services.
2) Resource Utilization and Allocation: As aforementioned, mobile or IoT users can use edge
computing services for the mobile blockchain. However, edge computing services have limited
capacity which may not be sufficient to support demand from all users. Edge computing resource
allocation issue arises. On the one hand, the users have different valuation of the edge computing
services. The valuation depends on certain factors such as reward and number of transactions
included in a block of the mobile blockchain. These factors influence the computing resource
demand of the users. The demand should be derived to maximize the utility of the users. On
the other hand, the users can compete for the edge computing services offered by the provider.
Therefore, the provider can maximize its profit by adjusting the price. For example, when the
edge computing resource demand is high, the price can be increased. On the contrary, when the
demand is low, the price can be decreased. With this fact, an economic model become a suitable
approach for the resource allocation.
IV. PROTOTYPE OF EDGE COMPUTING FOR MOBILE BLOCKCHAIN
To demonstrate the feasibility and practicability of the edge computing for mobile blockchain
presented in Section III, we implement a prototype system. As illustrated in Fig. 2(a), in the
mobile blockchain network, nodes, e.g., mobile or IoT devices, need to perform mining on the
edge computing server. The prototype uses a workstation with Intel Xeon CPU E5-1630 as the
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Figure 2: (a) Real mobile blockchain mining experimental setup with Ethereum which is a popular open ledger
(b) The comparison of experimental results with analytical results.
edge computing server and Android devices as the mobile nodes. The nodes act as the miners,
installing a mobile blockchain client application. The application can record data using internal
sensors, e.g. an accelerometer and GPS, or the transactions of mobile peer-to-peer data transfer.
In Fig. 2(a), the computer screens shown in Boxes 1 and 2 display the Ethereum, which is one
of the most commonly used blockchain platform, running on the workstation, i.e., Box 5. The
mobile devices in Box 4 are connected to the edge computing server through a network hub (Box
3) using the mobile blockchain client application. The basic mining steps can be implemented
as follows. The miners request the computing service from the server and mine a block with the
assistance of Ethereum services provided accordingly. The mined blocks in blockchain can be
accessed and distributed through the Ethereum function.
We conduct the following experiments for performance evaluation. We first create 1000 blocks
using Node.js and use the mobile devices to initiate the mining of the blocks. We consider two
cases with three miners and four miners. In the three miner case, we first fix edge computing
service demand (CPU utilization) of two miners at 40 and 60, and vary the demand of the other
miner. In the four miner case, we fix the demand of three miners at 40, 50 and 60, and the
demand of the other miner. The number of transactions in each mined block is 10, i.e., the size
of a block is the same. Note that we can control the time-scale of the experiment by adjusting
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Figure 3: Mobile edge computing enabled blockchain system with the two-stage Stackelberg game model.
the “difficulty target” in solving the PoW, as described in Section II-B.
The experimental results are shown in Fig. 2(b) in which when the edge computing service
demand increases, the probability that a miner successfully mines a block is higher. We also
compare the experimental results with the analytical results as derived in [14]. Clearly, the
analytical and experimental results match well.
V. EDGE COMPUTING RESOURCE MANAGEMENT FOR MOBILE BLOCKCHAIN
In this section, we first present the system model of edge computing for mobile blockchain.
Again, the provider deploying the mobile edge computing service aims to maximize the profit
through pricing. Therefore, the miners have to consider the reward from mining and the price
paid to the provider in deciding on the service demand. Therefore, we present the Stackelberg
game formulation and obtain the equilibrium.
A. Mobile Edge Computing for Blockchain Mining
The mobile blockchain network is composed of N users acting as the miners. Each user runs
mobile blockchain applications to record transaction data. An edge computing service provider
deploys edge computing servers for the miners. The PoW puzzle can be offloaded to the edge
computing server, and the miners are priced by the provider. Figure 3 shows the system model
of the mobile blockchain network. Note that we consider a relatively small blockchain network,
where the communication delay due to wireless access is negligible. The offloaded mining process
10
is secured by some security solutions, such as data masking or obfuscation to hide the details
of puzzle solving of the blockchain.
The provider, i.e., the seller, receives the payment from the miners, i.e., the buyers, which ac-
cess and consume the edge computing service. The communication and access to edge computing
service also consumes energy of miners, which is, nevertheless, much smaller than that needed to
solve the PoW. Therefore, a mobile device the user is capable of supporting the communication.
Each miner decides on service demand in accordance with the current blockchain operation, e.g.,
blockchain data synchronization. Here, the demand can be the CPU speed or the number of CPU
cores to be used. The provider accepts the demand and the edge computing server processes the
offloaded PoW solving for the miners. We can treat the edge computing service demand as the
(bought) computing power of the corresponding miner.
In the mobile blockchain network, miners compete against each other in order to be the first to
successfully solve the PoW. Once successfully solving the PoW, the miner broadcasts its solution
to the mobile blockchain network to reach consensus. The first miner to successfully mine a
block that reaches the consensus earns the mining reward. The reward is from the blockchain
applications, expressed as a utility function. The utility function of the ith miner who has xi
edge computing demand consists of two aspects: (1) The reward gained when a block is mined
and the consensus is reached, where the reward can include both a fixed and a variable parts;
(2) The cost incurred when solving the PoW, i.e., miner i pays a unit price pi to the provider
for using the edge computing service.
B. Two-Stage Stackelberg Game Formulation and Equilibrium
Game theory can be used to analyze the interaction among the provider and miners. For
example, in [9], the authors formulated a hierarchical Stackelberg game to solve the resource
management in fog computing networks, where the game theoretic study of the market and
pricing strategies are proposed. Similarly, the interaction between the provider and miners can
be modeled as a Stackelberg game, as illustrated in Fig. 3. The provider, i.e., the leader of the
game, first sets the price of the service per computing unit in the upper Stage I. The miners,
i.e., the followers, decide later on their optimal computing service demand for offloading the
mining task in the lower Stage II, being aware of the price set by the provider. By using backward
induction, we formulate the optimization problems for the leader and followers as two sub-games,
as follows.
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• Sub-game (Miners’ Mining Strategies in Stage II): When participating in the sub-game,
each rational miner i decides on the mining demand xi maximizing the expected utility,
given all the other miners’ demands, i.e., strategies, as well as the edge computing service
price pi.
• Sub-game (Provider’s pricing strategies in Stage I): The profit of the provider is the
revenue obtained from charging the miners for edge computing service minus the cost. The
service cost is a function of the service demand, e.g., electricity consumed.
The two stages of the sub-games together form the Stackelberg game. The objective of the
game is to find the Stackelberg equilibrium. The Stackelberg equilibrium ensures that the service
price, chosen by the provider, maximize the profit, given that all the miners achieve their best
responses which also maximize their utility. The best responses of the miners are obtained given
the service price from the provider, and the best responses constitute the Nash equilibrium in
the miners’ sub-game.
For the provider’s pricing, the uniform and discriminatory pricing schemes are adopted. Miners
are charged by the provider with the same service price in the uniform pricing scheme. For the
discriminatory pricing scheme, the provider charges each miner with exclusive service price. The
uniform pricing is easier to implement as the provider does not need to keep track of information
of all miners, and charging the same prices is fair for the miners. However, it may not yield the
highest profit compared with discriminatory pricing scheme. The reason is that the provider can
customize the service price specifically for each miner based on the the miner’s preferences in
the utility.
The solution of the Stackelberg game, as well as the proof of the existence and uniqueness of
each sub-game equilibrium can be done by employing backward induction. The detailed proof
steps are presented in [14].
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We investigate the performance of the proposed edge computing resource management for
mobile blockchain. We consider a group of mobile blockchain miners in the network and assume
the size of a block mined by a miner follows the normal distribution N (µt, σ2). The default
system parameter values are set as follows: µt = 200, σ2 = 5, R = 104, r = 20 and N = 100.
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Figure 4: Impacts of number of miners on total service demand. (In the legend, UP: Uniform Pricing, and DP:
Discriminatory Pricing)
A. Impacts of the Number of Miners
From Fig. 4, the total service demand of miners and the profit of the provider increase with
the increased number of miners in mobile blockchain. The reason is that having more miners can
generate more demand to the mobile edge computing service. In turn, the provider extracts more
surplus from miners and thereby has greater profit gain. Additionally, the service demand increase
becomes saturated as the number of miners increases to a certain point. The reason is that the
incentive of miners to increase their service demand is weakened because the probability of their
successful mining is lower with more miners. Moreover, the total service demand of miners and
the profit of the provider increase as µt increases. This is because when µt, the average size of
one block increases, the variable reward for each miner also increases. The incentive of miners
to increase their service demand is improved, and accordingly the total service demand of miners
increases. Consequently, the provider achieves greater profit gain. Further, we observe that the
total service demand of miners is lower under uniform pricing than that under discriminatory
pricing. The intuition is that, under discriminatory pricing, the provider can set different unit
prices of service demand for different miners. Slightly lower prices can be charged to encourage
higher total service demand from miners. This intuition is consistent with the following results.
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Figure 5: Impacts of mining reward: (a) Fixed mining reward to optimal edge service price; (b) Variable reward
factor to demand of miner.
B. Impacts of Reward on Miners
We study a group of 3 miners in the mobile blockchain network to study the impacts of
reward on each specific miner. From Fig. 5(a), the optimal price under discriminatory pricing
charging to the miners with the smaller block size is lower, e.g., miners 1 and 2. The reason is
that the variable reward of miners 1 and 2 for successful mining is smaller than that of miner 3.
Thus, miners 1 and 2 have no incentive to pay a high price for their service demand as miner
3 does. In this case, the provider can attract more service demand of miners 1 and 2 by setting
lower prices. Due to the competition from the other two miners for mining, miner 3 also has
an incentive to increase its service demand. However, due to the high service price, miner 3
reduces its service demand for saving cost. Nevertheless, the increase in service demand from
miners 1 and 2 are greater.
Furthermore, from Fig. 5(a), we observe that the optimal prices for miners 1 and 2 increase
with the increase of fixed mining reward. This is due to the fact that when the fixed reward
increases, the incentives of miners 1 and 2 to have higher service demand are greater. The
provider thus is able to raise the price and charge more for higher revenue, achieving greater
profit. Additionally, we observe from Fig. 5(b) that the optimal prices for miners 1 and 2 decrease
as the variable reward factor increases. The reason is that when the variable reward increases,
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an incentive of each miner to have higher service demand is greater. However, the incentives of
the miners with smaller block to mine, i.e., miners 1 and 2, are still not much as that of miner 3.
The incentives become smaller than that of miner 3 as the variable reward increases. Therefore,
the provider intends to set the lower price for miners 1 and 2 which may induce more service
demand.
Note that the Stackelberg game of the edge computing service for mobile blockchain aims
at maximizing the profit of the provider. Alternatively, social welfare, i.e., utility of miners, are
also important and should be maximized. Auction is a suitable tool to achieve this objective in
which some preliminary modeling and results are presented in [15]
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have introduced edge computing for mobile blockchain applications, espe-
cially for IoT blockchain mining tasks offloading with a demonstrated testbed and experimental
results. Then, for efficient edge resource management for mobile blockchain, we have presented
a Stackelberg game model. We have also conducted the numerical simulations to evaluate the
network performance, which may help the edge service providers achieve optimal resource
management policy and profit.
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